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I. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to gain knowledge of the determinants of
Argentina’s country risk, measured by the spread of sovereign bonds in relation
to comparable bonds of the U.S. Treasury. The importance of the subject lies
on the crucial role that this risk plays in determining financial costs and real
business cycles.
A review of the empirical literature shows that this subject has not been
studied enough. Only few economists have emphasized —taking into account
the domestic and international context of the 90s and the lessons from the
80s— the relevance of country risk on the dynamics of the Argentine
economy.
1 These authors base their analysis on three  approaches (which do
not exclude each other). A first group, has found a significant (negative)
correlation between the large macroeconomic aggregates and the risk premium
(Avila, 1997; Grandes, 1999; and Rodríguez, 1999). A second group has
emphasized the currency risk, arguing that once this disappears with
dollarization, there will be a lower Argentine risk and, therefore, a higher
growth and employment rate (Rubinstein, 1999). The third approach analyzes
the relationship between capital flows, contagion effects and the incidence
on sovereign risk of emerging countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996; Calvo,
1999). Also, an increasing number of studies have analyzed the determinants
of the sovereign risk, using cross-section of countries. However, these papers
have not focused on the determinants of Argentina’s country risk.
We organize our contribution as follows. In Section II, we discuss the
scope of the subject and the theoretical framework, while in Section III we
present the analysis of the determinants of sovereign or country risk. In
Section IV, we present estimates of the econometric model. Using this model,
Section V offers an alternative analysis of the possible effects that a
1 From now on, we will refer to country risk as a synonym of sovereign risk. Nevertheless,
these concepts are not necessarily equivalent. For instance, “country” risk can include the
risk of the provincial debt or the private debt.127 COUNTR Y RISK
dollarization policy could have. Finally, in Section VI, we draw the main
conclusions and policy recommendations.
II. Relevance of the Subject and Theoretical Framework
Figure 1 shows for the 1994-1998 period, the relation between country
risk (SPFRB, approximated by the spread between the floating rate bond and
a similar bond of the U.S. Treasury), and the interannual variations of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
2
2 The pioneer paper analyzing the relation between these variables is by Avila (1998).
More recently, Nogués (1999) presented Figure 1 in an article in La Nación, and Rodríguez
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This negative correlation is not surprising when we recall that the most
important components of GDP —private consumption and investment in
equipment— are negatively correlated with country risk. For instance, the
simple correlation between the interannual variations of these variables and
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the country risk lagged one period, are -0,61 and -0,80 respectively.
3 On the
other hand, the correlation between the interannual variation of GDP and
country risk —also lagged one period— is -0,86.
Are these spurious correlations or are there solid grounds to argue that
there should be an association between country risk and the behavior of
macroeconomic variables? The relationships between financial variables and
country risk helps to explain why changes in this last variable has an impact
on the main components of aggregate demand. In an economy like Argentina,
open to international capital flows, the evolution of interest rates is closely
determined by country risk (and if we considered a group of bonds with
different maturities, the corresponding spreads would determine the structure
of interest rates). Figure 2 shows, for instance, that during the period under
analysis, the behavior of the 30 day domestic prime rate in dollars
(PRIMEU$S) is associated with country risk.
3 The coefficients of correlation presented in this section use quarterly observations for the
1994-I  to 1998-IV period. For a multivariate analysis of the determinants of investment in




















Figure 2. Domestic Prime Rate and Country Risk
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In a nutshell, being a small country, Argentina faces a very elastic supply
of financing (except in times of rationing), and therefore the upward and
downward shifts of this schedule determine the equilibrium interest rate. In
other words, the analysis of the determinants of country risk is also an analysis
of the variables determining the shifts of the supply of loanable funds faced
by the country. Therefore, increases in country risk should be negatively
associated with capital flows. Figure 3 shows that this has in fact happened in
connection with flows from the non-financial private sector (PNSPRNF).
4, 5
4 In this case, the simple correlation coefficient between these capital flows and country
risk is -0.58.
5 The Federal Government has the possibility of financing itself through multilateral credit
institutions. These capital flows tend to be positively associated with country risk. When
country risk increases and the private sector has difficulties financing itself in the
international markets, the Federal Government lessens the recessive effects by borrowing
from multilateral credit institutions. Obviously, given the loanable restrictions of these
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Therefore, to make headway towards the knowledge of country risk
determinants, also means to make progress on the determinants of capital
flows and consequently, on Argentina’s business cycles.
III. The Determinants of Country Risk
A. The Risk Premium in Equilibrium
For an economy with high capital mobility and imperfect substitute assets,
assuming that lenders are risk neutral, the rate of return rate on a sovereign
bond depends on the following arbitrage condition (see Edwards, 1986, and
Min, 1998):
(1-p) (1 + i
* + s) = 1 + i
*                                                                          (1)
where i
* is the risk free rate of return on the U.S. Treasury, s is the country
risk premium and p is the probability of default (linked to the capacity and
willingness for debt repayment). Therefore:
s = (p/(1-p)) k                                                                          (2)
where k = 1 + i
*. As the probability of default tends to one, the risk premium
approaches infinity. Graphically, we observe that the relation between s and p
implies a variation of the supply of funds —for a given i
*—, because when
the size of the debt increases (in relation to GDP), the probability of default
also increases (Figure 4). As this approaches one, the borrower will see his
possibilities of placing bonds restrained (“rationing”).
6
6 In practice, this would not necessarily have to approach one. In times of  financial crises,
due to contagion effects or other channels of transmission, countries could be rationed
even though their  relative debt size is not significant. Likewise, this analysis assumes that
in case of default, the lender loses all the capital plus the interest accrued by the bond. If
the lender recovered part of the debt, p would be multiplied by a delta factor between 0 and
1 in (2).131 COUNTR Y RISK
According to Edwards (1986), p can be approached with a logistic function:
p = (exp       b
i X
i)/ (1+ exp      b
i X
i)                                                          (3)
where X
i  are
 the determinants of the sovereign risk premia and b
i the respective
impact coefficients.
Finally, combining (2) and (3), applying natural logs, the equation turns
out to be:
7
Log s = a + log k +       b
i X
i                                                                                                                (4)
B. Which Would be the X
i to Consider?
A first idea about the determinants of country risk emerges from the analysis
of sovereign rating agencies. These agencies monitor the evolution of
governments’ debt and their economies, issuing recommendations about the
quality of the debt. Usually, those recommendations –appropriate or not—
0
Figure 4. Size of the Debt and Probability of Default
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7 Our regression model, will be a slightly modified version of this equation.132 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
have a notorious impact on investors’portfolio decisions and in general, they
bring about changes in relative asset demands and bond prices (see, for
instance, Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1999; Cantor and Packer, 1996).
Rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s (see Standard & Poor’s 1999b)
focus their analysis on three determinants of country risk, which are common
sense: (1) Indicators of liquidity/solvency: these are macroeconomic variables,
related to the possibilities of debt repayment; (2) Political uncertainty; and
(3) Structural reforms.
8
Our paper will also analyze other factors determining risk levels, including
the contagion effect. These are described in Section IV.
As noted before, these theories have been devised using alternative methods
to evaluate sovereign risk determinants. First, a cross section of countries has
been used to explain: a) the ratings of agencies (Haque, Mark and Mathieson,
1998; Cantor and Packer, 1996; and Kiguel and Lopetegui, 1997), b) the
bond spreads (Calvo and Reinhardt, 1996; and Calvo, 1999), and, c) the
relationship between both (Kiguel and Lopetegui, 1997; and Reisen and Von
Maltzan, 1999). Second, there have been few country specific studies (Barbone
and Forni, 1997, and Rubinstein, 1999). Finally, others have used a
combination of both methods (Min, 1998; and Eichengreen and Mody, 1998).
IV. Econometric Estimation
A. Selected Variables
The proposed model explains country risk as a function of the behavior of
a set of variables (X
i), classified according to the theoretical framework
8 Other approaches to evaluate the price of sovereign bonds or their risk premium include:
a) the theory of options: an application of the theorems of Black and Scholes and Modigliani-
Miller and, b) a relatively new approach, characterizing the function of sovereign risk
according to the distributions of Schwartz or generalized functions, emphasizing the
qualitative changes in sovereign ratings (Abelar, 1999).133 COUNTR Y RISK
outlined above. That is, the sovereign risk premium, measured by the spread
of the floating rate bond (SPFRB)
9 is a function of:
Macroeconomic fundamentals
Essentially, we propose that reductions in budget surplus (DFISCSA), or
increases in fiscal deficit (when DFISCSA takes on negative values), will
raise the country risk, even more so under convertibility, where fiscal policy
is the main macroeconomic instrument.
10 A fiscal deficit that investors deem
high, increasing or unsustainable (even though this perception is not accurate)
would frame the most pessimistic scenario. It is also possible to present
arguments in favor of analyzing the role of public expenditures, the tax
structure, or the fiscal responsibility of the Federal Government and the
provinces separately. However, our hypothesis is that these are, from the point
of view of investors, of second order importance. In their generation of short
and medium term expectations, they do not care so much on how the deficit
is going to be reduced, but if this is going to happen in a sustainable way. We
will return to this issue in the last section.
We also argue that growth expectations affect country risk
11. If investors
9 We used the FRB because of its high liquidity and its role as a determinant of the tendency
of the bonds of Argentine debt. In any case, this selection is not free of criticism, (see
Abelar, 1999). Alternatively, we could have used the EMBI (emerging market bond
indicator), from JP Morgan. However, this index includes a variety of  bonds (Global,
Brady, Bocones, and other bonds) with different degrees of maturity and guarantees.
Although there are problems with any selection, it is important to know that for Argentina,
there is a high correlation between the FRB and the EMBI.
10 The fiscal deficit is from the Federal Administration without taking into account
privatizations, and without consolidating the provinces. It comprises the seasonally adjusted
deficit accumulated over a period of  three months.
11 We do not infer from here causality between country risk and the growth rate. Moreover,
these variables might be clearly endogenous, and this fact could bring about some
consequences to the econometric estimation. Some authors (Avila, 1998 and Rodríguez,134 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
expect the economy to grow, then the country risk should decline among
other things, because of the effects that this growth generates over the size of
the fiscal deficit.
To capture growth expectations, we assume that investors have perfect
foresight. We apply this assumption by recalling that GDP data is known
with one-quarter lag. Therefore, growth expectations in period T-1 for period
T, would be the growth rate in T, which in fact is published with a lag.
Consequently, we have included the GDP growth rate estimated as a seasonally
adjusted monthly value, as an explanatory variable. The growth rate is the
difference between the logs of GDP in T and T-1 (DLGDP93SA). We have
considered that alternative monthly data such as the industrial survey are too
partial and therefore, they would capture growth expectations in an imperfect
way.
Intertemporal liquidity/solvency variables
Among the possible variables that capture the intertemporal liquidity
situation of a country, analysts assess external debt services (capital and
interest) to exports ratio (SERVEXPOSA)
12. Increases in this ratio are
expected to increase country risk. During the period under analysis, both
variables have grown but the ratio has been increasing. The reason is due to
1999) suggest that country risk determines the short term growth rate (for instance, through
the effect on physical investments). However, a Granger casuality test between country
risk premium and the growth rate did not provide definite results to conclude causality in
one direction or the other. We think that there are reasons to argue that this causality is  two
way. See appendix (e) for the results of the test.
12 Interests and capital services come from the balance of payments estimates. For 1994,
there is no data on debt amortizations of the non-financial private sector. Also, due to lack
of information, capital services of the financial sector –excluding the Central Bank– are
not included. The capital services of the public sector exclude the conversions of debt due
to privatizations or former debt repurchasing. Exports were seasonally adjusted. Otherwise,
the fluctuations of that indicator would be magnified by seasonal factors. On the other
hand, debt service is estimated on an accrual basis.135 COUNTR Y RISK
an important rise in public external debt, mainly to finance fiscal deficits, and
the increase of private external debt
13, associated to a group of firms, most of
them linked to foreign direct investment
 (Secretary of Economic and Regional
Programming, 1999a).
Another solvency variable is the current account surplus to GDP ratio
(CCGDP). Some analysts even mention certain negative values of this ratio
(usually around -5%) below which it becomes too risky to lend to the country.
We believe that there may be non-linearities but not discontinuities in these
economic relationships. As shown in Figure 5, in Argentina as in many other
countries, the current account deficit is shaped by the trade deficit. Therefore,
the current account includes significant information that is not captured by
the ratio of debt service to exports.
The trade balance depends on prices and quantities. Being a small country,
Argentina is a price taker and consequently, we could say that the terms of
trade (TI) are a determinant of country risk.
Contagion effects
We have captured these effects through the J. P. Morgan’s price index of
Mexican bonds (EMBIMEX) and other non-Latin American countries
(EMBINONLAT). We chose Mexico because of the historical similarities
with Argentina in terms of economic policy and response to external shocks
(Brazil, despite its influence on the Mercosur, has differed, for instance, in
foreign capital regulations, the trade openness degree, dollarization extent,
etc).
14Obviously, we expect increases in these sovereign risks to have a positive
13 In the case of Argentina, there is simultaneity between the fiscal deficits and the increases
of the public external debt, but the debt service is determined mainly by the accumulated
stock. There are other simultaneous effects, which we will comment as we discuss the
results.
14 The Mexican EMBI is correlated with the Brazil EMBI and, if we replace one with the
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Figure 5. Current Account Deficit
effect on Argentina’s country risk. According to this theory, the path of
emerging bond prices would be influenced by “herd behavior”, resulting from
the simplistic similarities that large international operators of financial funds
find between “emerging” countries. The most recent example of this kind of
behavior was observed during the Russian “default” and later in the southern
cone, while Brazilian devaluation was taking place.
15
15 Although the econometric treatment of the possible existence of credit rationing is beyond
the scope of this paper, the contagion variable is also capturing the reduction in the supply
of loanable funds, particularly in times of financial market turmoil.
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Other external shocks
Other external shocks can arise from changes in the conditions of
international financial markets. We have tried to capture these conditions by
including the rate of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond (UST30) as an explanatory
variable. We expect, through a substitution effect, that increases in the interest
rate make the investment in these bonds more attractive, so that the supply of
loanable funds for emerging countries would diminish and, therefore, the
country risk would increase. On the other hand, we observe that, in periods of
extreme crises, investors take refuge in risk free bonds, in detriment of the
emerging markets, pushing U.S. bond rates down and increasing country risk
of emerging markets. Then, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous.
We have also introduced a dummy variable to reflect the impact of the
Mexican crisis. This variable (TEQUILA) would be capturing the effects on
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After the Tequila, the banking system became stronger due to the adoption
of more stringent regulations than the Basle ones, and the larger concentration
and presence of foreign capital in the local banking sector. Because of this,
the strength of the financial system is no longer an important concern of the
rating agencies (see Standard & Poor’s, 1999a). In fact, the correlation between
deposits and SPFRB drops significantly after the Tequila.
Political noise
Although there are numerous situations when the untimely statements or
the turmoil among political leaders could have provoked a negative perception
among investors, we chose to test the political noise associated to the
resignation of former Minister Cavallo (CAVALLO).
16
Sovereign risk’s own story
We have included lags of the spreads of FRB bonds (SPFRB
t-j ) in order to
test for persistent factors that may not be captured by other variables.
Summing up, the following is the econometric model we propose with the
expected signs in parentheses:
SPFRB =F (EMBIMEX (-), SERVEXPOSA (+), DLGDP93SA (-),
CCGDP (-), DFISCSA (-), UST30 (+  -), TI (-),
EMBINONLAT (+), TEQUILA (+), POLITICAL NOISE (+),
SPFRB
t-j (+))
The equation was estimated by ordinary least squares, setting a log-linear
relationship among the variables, with the exception of CCGDP and
DFISCSA, whose values are mostly negative and thereby cannot be
transformed to logs. The monthly data comprise the period running from
16 A continuous political noise variable would had been preferable, but it does not exist.139 COUNTR Y RISK
January 1994 to December 1998. In appendix (a) we explain the data sources
and the method of transforming quarterly to monthly values used for some
variables including GDP.
17 Considering the fact this is a time series model,
we also controlled for stationarity and checked the existence of a long run
structural relation through a relatively new methodology developed by Pesaran
et al (1999).
18
The Tequila effect and the exit of former Minister Cavallo are captured by
binary variables where Tequila = 1 between 1995:1 and 1995:5 and zero
otherwise, and Cavallo = 1 in 1996:3 and 4, due to the rumors associated to
the differences between the former Minister and the President, and 1996: 7
and 8, moment of Cavallo’s resignation and its immediate effects.
The estimated coefficients can be read as elasticities, except for CCGDP
and DFISCSA which are semielasticities (percent change of the dependent
variable due to an absolute change in the independent variable). Time lags of
the independent variables were also included with the purpose of capturing
partial adjustment effects.
19 Remaining lags were chosen through tests of
omitted/redundant variables, beginning with a more restricted model, and
going from particular to general, to minimize the loss of freedom degrees.
17 GDP, the current account, the debt service, and the terms of trade index were transformed
to monthly data with MATLAB (mathematical software), using the cubic Spline algorithm.
See Appendix a.
18 To verify if the variables presented stochastic tendencies (unit roots) or some kind of
deterministic tendencies, we performed the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see Appendix
b). Afterwards, irrespective of the integration order we tested the existence of a long run
association among the variables (Appendix c) to estimate the restricted model, adding up
the error correction model which fitted better (Appendix c’).
19 This could be testing markets’ efficiency for long term bonds. However, the typical test
consists of analyzing whether the series follows a random walk process (the price today is
equal to the price yesterday plus a white noise), which is verified (although the shocks do
not show such a high persistence, according to ADF statistic value, Appendix a).140 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
B. Result of the Estimations
Table 1 shows the best outcome of the econometric estimations. The
estimated coefficients are significant both individually and globally at a 1%
confidence level, and the regression does not have problems of serial
correlation, heteroskedasticity or instability (see statistical Appendix d).
20
20 LSERVEXPOSA (-1) is significant at 2.5% confidence level.
Table 1. Spreads Function Estimates 1994-1998
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic Probability
LEMBIMEX -2.163204 -29.191290  0.0000
DLSERVEXPOSA  0.507456  4.672421  0.0000
LSERVEXPOSA(-1)  0.174321  2.333700  0.0239
DLGDP93SA -20.545940 -9.657788  0.0000
VDFISCSA -0.000173 -5.674725  0.0000
DFISCSA(-1) -0.000184 -8.455935  0.0000
LUST30 -1.978578 -13.419070  0.0000
TEQUILA -0.388229 -7.306245  0.0000
CAVALLO 0.127047  3.251272  0.0021
C 20.208630  42.693180  0.0000
R
2                          0.9721 Adjusted R
2 0.9667
F-statistic 182.1 Durbin-Watson   2.0232
In the estimation of the whole model, LTI, CCGDP, LEMBINONLAT
and the lagged dependent variable were not significant. As said, the terms of
trade effects are implicit in the current account deficit. However, the variable
CCGDP was not significant either, and our hypothesis is that investors pay141 COUNTR Y RISK
more attention to indicators of intertemporal solvency like SERVEXPOSA,
than to variables that have important cyclical variations. On the other hand,
EMBINONLAT is strongly correlated to EMBIMEX and the estimations
corroborate that this country had, during the period under analysis, more cross
contagion effects with Argentina.
Dismissing the statistically non-significant variables, the estimates had
the outcome presented above. Except for the Tequila effect, the signs of the
estimators are the expected ones and that of LUST30 is explained later. Our
hypothesis on the negative sign of the Tequila variable is that, when “clouds”
were visualized over the Argentine economy, political determination to
overcome the crisis, as well as clear signals from international financial
institutions in support of the economic program, were combined to diminish
the negative consequences caused by contagion effects. We recall that the
President, his Minister of Economy and the Congress acted decisively.
Likewise, the IMF, the World Bank and the IDB prepared their assistance
program in record time. We think that this determination was crucial to lessen
and to overcome an extremely serious financial-banking crisis.
Other results suggest first, that a 1% increase in the price of Mexican
bonds (“less emerging risk”) produces a drop of Argentine risk of 2.16%.
21
Second, a variation of the same magnitude in the debt service to export ratio
of the previous month and in its rate of growth (DLSERVEXPOSA) generates
a 0.17% and 0.5% increase in that risk respectively.
22 That is, a permanent
21 It is fair to acknowledge that LEMBIMEX accounts for almost half the R-squared, as the
Mexican risk co-moves rather similarly with the Argentinean one. However, from early
1998 on –and especially in the aftermath of the Russian default– the first has been clearly
differing from Argentinean spreads due to a lot of good news for the Mexican economy
(e.g. growth, investment grade in March 2000). So the idea of including LEMBIMEX was
exactly to be aware of the impact of emerging risk on Argentinean total risk.
22 Taking into account that debt service data for 1994 is not strictly comparable with those
in 1995-1998 (see note 12), we estimated the same equation in this last period to confirm
the strength of the results (see Appendix f).142 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
1% increase in this variable and in its growth rate, causes a permanent 0.67%
increase in the spread of the FRB. This result, as we will emphasize in the last
section, has important policy implications.
The effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on LSPFRB are also
important. An increase in growth expectations of 1 point (i.e. growth of 2%
instead of 1%) would reduce country risk by almost 20%. The reduction of
the fiscal deficit (i.e. DFISCSA less negative or more positive in case of
surplus) has also a positive impact on the evolution of LSPFRB: for each 300
millions pesos decrease in the three months accumulated deficit, the sovereign
risk would go down by approximately 5.4%.
23 The variation of this deficit
also has an influence on LSPFRB (investors analyze not only the level of the
deficit, but also its change). As said, part of the short-term impact of fiscal
deficits may be captured by the growth expectation variable.
The negative sign of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond rate needs some
comment. A priori, we expected that an increase in this rate attracted additional
investment to this instrument in detriment of capital flows to emerging
countries. Nevertheless, as we see in Figure 7, the correlation between the
spread of the FRB and the rate of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond is very low.
However, there are clear inverse relations in periods of turmoil or extreme
financial crises (Mexico, Asia, Russia). In these cases, what we have seen is
that as the perceived risk of investing in emerging markets increases, investors
“fly to quality” by buying Treasury bonds. Other contributions like Min’s
(1998) have also found that U.S. Treasury bonds rates don’t have significant
substitution effects with emerging bonds.
In a panel data study, Eichengreen and Mody (1998) find a similar result.
These authors assert that movements in U.S. Treasury bonds rate should be
23 The estimate is 300 (low dfiscsa)* -0.000184 = -0.0552. Although this means an increase
of 0.05526 in the log, when we are close to the point where the variable changes, the linear
approximation to the function y = ebx -being y = spread, x = dfiscsa and b=0.000184- is







0 500 1000 1500 2000
SPFRB
Figure 7
Scatter Diagram Tequila Effect








































97:07 97:08 97:09 97:10 97:11 97:12
SPFRB2 UST30
understood in terms of supply and demand. On the supply side, when the rate
goes up, the increased debt servicing costs reduces the supply of external
debt. This in turn would increase the price of emerging bonds reducing their
spreads. On the demand side, when Treasury bonds rate goes up, there would
be investors’ tendency to substitute emerging bonds with U.S. Treasury bonds,
and the spreads would increase. According to those authors, in recent years
supply factors have prevailed.144 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
C. Forecasts
An alternative way of evaluating the model is to analyze the in-sample
forecasts emerging from it, using indicators such as the mean square error as
criterions. The forecast shown is recursive, that is, the model is recalculated
for the period T and T + 1 with known data of the independent variables for
that period. If, for example, the year 1998 is projected, the values observed in
Table  2 show the results.














V. An Observation on the Project of Dollarization
The sovereign risk can be broadly considered the sum of 1) the default
risk, 2)  the  risk of devaluation or currency risk, 3) the political risk and, 4)
other domestic and foreign institutional risks.145 COUNTR Y RISK
A non-anticipated devaluation can compromise debt repayment. The larger
the proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency and the less dollarized
are fiscal revenues (current and capital), the higher the default risk. In other
words, the government would have to make a bigger fiscal effort in order to
serve the debt. Under those conditions, investors would demand an additional
risk premium to maintain assets of the country that face a possibility of
devaluation.
Recently, due to the Brazilian crisis and the important external volatility,
in Argentina the project of dollarization has been gaining ground. One of the
eventual advantages of dollarization would be the disappearance of currency
risk with a corresponding –according to the advocates of this policy– reduction
of country risk. This statement has been discussed in the academic-professional
literature, and some recent papers have explored the impact of implementing
a policy of dollarization on the interest rate (see, for instance, Rubinstein,
1999).
24 Regarding these papers, we have some remarks:
• The way to measure the currency risk is partially incorrect: In general,
those studies use the difference between the returns of the Bocon in pesos
(PRE1) and the Bocon in dollars (PRE2).
25 However, that difference is not
exactly the risk of maintaining an asset in one currency or another, because
the spread of these bonds also includes other risks such as the default risk, the
political risk, and others. Precisely, in the event of a devaluation, the repayment
of PRE2 could be compromised more than the repayment of PRE1.
• At the same time, there would be a simultaneity bias in determining
the sovereign risk and the currency risk, because this is a component of the
first one. As a solution to this shortcoming, an instrumental variable (for
instance, the lags) is usually used. The  forward exchange rate, though it
24 Some economists have argued that the elimination of the currency risk could be more
than compensated by increases in the total risk due to lack of competitiveness, fiscal
insolvency or probability of reestablishing the peso if dollarization is implemented
unilaterally.
25 Rubinstein (1999) uses the following indicator: (((1 + PRE1)/(1 + PRE2)) - 1)*10000.146 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
represents a thinner market, is a more genuine way of measuring the
expectation of devaluation.
26
• The order of temporal precedence is not clear (Figure 8). Even assuming
simultaneity, causality in a Granger sense can be tested. Taking the spreads of
the FRB (SPFRB) and the bocones, we conclude that the order of causality is
reverse to the one assumed: with a 1% significance, SPFRB Granger-cause
PRE1_PRE2, in the period 1994:1 to 1998:12 (Table 3).
Furthermore, in the model of the previous section, the joint effect of the
variable PRE1_PRE2 and its lags (up to t-3) was redundant.
27 That is, in a
26 Another problem with the series of the forward exchange rate is the sample size. The one
compiled by JP Morgan begins in 1997.
27 Strictly speaking, since the FRB is issued in dollars, the currency risk is null. However,
we want to verify that this did not have another indirect effects on SPRFB, which were not
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Table 3
Null Hypothesis Obs F Probability
PRE1_PRE2 does not Granger cause SPFRB 54  0.74251  0.61862
SPFRB does not Granger cause PRE1_PRE2 54  4.19727  0.00222
joint test, the currency risk measured by this difference, turned out not to be a
statistically significant variable to explain LSPFRB (Table 4). This means
that its elimination would not have a statistically significant impact on country
risk.
Table 4
Redundant Variables: LPRE1_PRE2 (0 to -3)
F-statistic  0.457169     Probability 0.766512
Log likelihood ratio  2.514626     Probability 0.642019
The explanation we offer is that the currency risk is explained by almost
the same variables that explain country risk. The econometric evidence
supporting this hypothesis is shown in appendix g. This does not necessarily
mean that a dollarization project would not decrease sovereign risk. Our results
indicate that if the fundamental variables explaining country risk do not
improve, then dollarization will not revert the situation. Obviously, the effects
of a policy of dollarization also depend on the institutional characteristics
that go together with its implementation. This is an important subject which
is beyond the scope of this paper.148 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
VI. Summary and Policy Recommendations
Several economists, including the authors, have emphasized the relevance
of the fact that country risk is correlated with the business cycles. That happens
because Argentina is a country open to international capital flows and therefore,
the structural conditions of the financial markets faced by agents are associated
to these flows.
Under this situation the key question is: Which factors determine country
risk? The purpose of this paper has been to provide an answer to this question
and as far as we know, it offers the first econometric analysis for Argentina.
Using monthly data for the period 1994-1998, we conclude that the important
fluctuations observed in country risk have been determined by: (i) the external
debt service (capital and interests) to export ratio as a variable reflecting the
burden of the debt, (ii) the fiscal deficit of the Federal Government as a variable
reflecting the disequilibrium of public accounts, (iii) growth expectations as
a variable reflecting the potentiality of the economy, (iv) the rate of the 30
year U.S. Treasury bond as a variable reflecting the conditions and substitution
possibilities of international financial markets, (v) the contagion effect and,
(vi) political noise.
Regarding the impact of a possible dollarization policy, we recall that the
devaluation risk is a component of country risk. However, we find that
eliminating the devaluation risk (measured through the differential of the
returns on bocones in pesos and in dollars) would not have a statistically
significant impact on country risk. The explanation we offer is that devaluation
risk is determined by practically the same variables that explain country risk.
This evidence suggests that what is important in order to diminish this risk is
not the implementation of a unilateral dollarization policy, but a sound
administration of economic fundamentals.
Going now to the implications of our basic findings, we stress in the first
place, that during the period under analysis, the variables capturing the situation
of external payments of the country have deteriorated significantly. For149 COUNTR Y RISK
instance, between 1995 and 1998, the debt service practically doubled, while
the value of exports increased by only 26%. This deterioration of solvency
indicators plus the more restrictive conditions in the international financial
markets, imply that the country risk has suffered a structural increase and,
unless extraordinary conditions develop, it will be very difficult to lower this
risk to the levels observed during say 1997 when the average spread of the
FRB was around 360 basis points.
Given the impossibility of significantly reducing the debt service in the
short and medium term, we conclude that one of the main factors leading to
lower country risk is the export growth. Although Argentina is a price taker,
this does not mean that important productivity enhancing and market opening
policies should be disregarded. For example, at the Uruguay Round, Argentina
received no concessions of economic significance. During the next years,
these negotiating weaknesses will have to change in order to improve
Argentina’s export and growth performance.
Our paper also shows that fiscal deficit has direct negative effects in the
short and medium run (through an increase in the debt stock as well as its
service). In the short run, the deficit should be reduced significantly in order
to stabilize and revert the growing external debt. Eventually, the deficit should
turn into a surplus, part of which could be used to diminish the debt stock. In
that sense, the approval of the law of fiscal solvency is a major step forward
which if implemented, will put an asymptotic limit to the stock of external
public debt of the National Government. The sooner equilibrium and fiscal
surpluses are achieved in a credible and sustainable way, the faster will be the
reduction in country risk. Here the key words are credible and sustainable
and that depends not only on economic factors, but also on social and political
situations. In this context, the worst scenario is one where the fiscal
responsibility law is not enforced, or the uncertainty generated by the legislative
process is such that the political noise ends up raising the country risk. Recently,
we have observed several episodes when this has happened. Therefore, besides
good policies, it is important for the political leaders to be aware of the
magnitude of what is at stake for the country. Only then and after a consistent150 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS




The information comes from the following sources: (1) FRB spreads,
national accounts, balance of payments accounts, fiscal deficit and debt service
from the Ministry of Economy and Public Works (MEyOSP); (2) terms of
trade from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC); (3) EMBI
(Emerging Market Bond Indicator) from JPMorgan, monthly averages, base
100 index, December, 1993 and; (4) 30 year U.S. Treasury bond rate from
Yahoo-Finance-Stock Quotes.
Quarterly based series like GDP (current and constant prices), debt service,
current account, and the terms of trade were transformed to monthly
observations using an algorithm supplied by the MATLAB 4.0 program. This
algorithm  interpolates  values  within a quarter using a polynomial function
–usually cubic– that adjusts the data, adding the missing values in between
the endpoints, according to a desired frequency.
B. Unit Roots Tests
For all the variables we performed ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and
joint significance tests to check whether the data presented stochastic or
deterministic (linear, exponential, etc.) tendencies. The general specification
was the following:
DY
t = a + g Y
t-1 + b t +      DY
t-1 + e
t
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optimum lags for       DY
t-1, are shown next:
28
Table A-1
      Variable Optimum lags H 0: g = 0; t value Limit value at 5%
LSPFRB 2 -1.6284 -2.89
LTI 7 -1.2242 -2.89
LEMBIMEX 6 -0.4224 -2.89
LEMBINONLAT 11 -2.0227 -2.93
LSERVEXPOSA 15 0.1820 -2.93
LUST30 0 -0.1767 -2.89
CCGDP 16 -2.2700 -2.93
PRE1_PRE2 0 -3.3154 -2.89
LGDP93SA 7 -0.1744 -2.89
DFISCSA 5 -3.4120 -2.89
Table A-2
Variable Optimum lags H0: g=a=0; q i values Limit value at 5%
LSPFRB 2 1.4900 4.71
LTI 7 0.7600 4.71
LEMBIMEX 6 1.1592 4.71
LEMBINONLAT 11 2.4140 4.86
LSERVEXPOSA 11 0.7124 4.86
LUST30 0 0.2829 4.71
CCGDP 16 3.0000 4.86
PRE1_PRE2 0 5.4900 4.71
LGDP93SA 7 0.7226 4.71





28 The optimum number of lags is chosen according to the minimum value of information
criteria like Schwartz or Akaike, comparing equal size samples.152 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table A-3
Variable Optimum lags H0: g=b=0; q i values Limit value at 5%
LSPFRB 2 1.5165 6.49
LTI 7 1.6200 6.49
LEMBIMEX 6 2.3145 6.49
LEMBINONLAT 11 1.9900 6.73
LSERVEXPOSA 15 1.4460 6.73
LUST30 0 6.3473 6.49
CCGDP 16 2.5076 6.73
PRE1_PRE2 0 6.2423 6.49
LGDP93SA 7 4.8400 6.49
DFISCSA 5 5.8600 6.49
C. Pesaran, Shin and Smith Test
The traditional approach to verify the existence of a long-term relationship
among a set of variables is based on cointegration techniques (Engle and
Granger, 1987; Phillips and Ouilaris, 1990; Johansen, 1991 and 1995; among
others). These techniques require variables to be integrated of order one, I(1).
Pesaran et al (1999) have proposed a new approach to test the existence of a
long-term relation that can be applied independently from the order of
integration of the regressors. This means that it is not transcendental if they
are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. The underlying statistic is the Wald or
F-statistic in a Dickey-Fuller regression (ARDL model).
The authors supply two sets of asymptotic critical values for the polar
cases: the first assumes that all the variables are I(1), while the second assumes
that all are I(0). So all the possibilities are delimited for any classification
from a combination of these limit values. If the Wald or the F statistic computed
falls outside the area delimited by those values, then a conclusive inference
on the long term relationship could be induced independently of whether the153 COUNTR Y RISK
regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Nevertheless, if the Wald
and the F statistics fall within the delimited area, the inference would be
inconclusive and it would be necessary to know the order of integration of
the regressors.
Likewise, the test can be performed whether the dependent variable follows
a deterministic tendency, or not. In the case of the spread of a bond, we opted
for the second choice. Therefore, we estimated the following equation selecting
the quantity of lags according to the above-mentioned Akaike-criteria (the
minimum):
D Lspfrb
t = a + l Lspfrb 
t-1 + b W





t                              (1)
where Z
t = (LSPFRB, LTI, LEMBIMEX, LEMBINONLA T, LSERVEXPOSA,
LUST30, CCGDP, DFISCSA, DLGDP93SA) =  (LSPFRB, W
t ); b  is a
parameter vector.
The null hypothesis is Ho:  l = b  = 0
The number of optimum lags was 6 (according the Akaike’s minimum
criteria) and as a question of parsimony –so that we do not use excessive
parameters in the model– non-significant variables were excluded in the
equation (1), that is: LTI, CCPBI and LEMBINONLA T). The result of the
test shed the following value for F:
F   6.474187     Probability   0.001297
As the asymptotic F distribution under the null hypothesis is not standard,
we used the critical values estimated by Pesaran et al in Table C1.iii, page
[T.2]. For k = 5 regressors and 5% significance, those values are 2.62 –lowest
limit when the regressors are I(0)– and 3.79 –highest limit when the regressors
are I(1). Given the estimated F, we conclude that there could be a long run
relation among the variables irrespective they are cointegrated, or they are
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C’. Associated Error Correction Model
Once the long-run relationship was regressed (Table 1) we went forward
to estimate the corresponding ECM (error correction model) in order to see
the short-term dynamics of sovereign spreads corresponding to the structural
model. The ECM representation can be defined as follows:
D Lspfrb
t = a + r Resid
 t - 1 + D Lspfrb
t - j1 +      g




 t-1 are the residuals from equation in Table 1, D means the
first difference of any variable, X refers to the remaining independent variables
and e
t is an independently identically distributed error. For a matter of stability
it is expected r to be negative and smaller than one, as it works like the
mechanism which takes Lspfrb back to its long-run equilibrium level when a
short-term deviation occurs. After carefully carrying out this two-step
estimation and with a parsimonious purpose –but ensuring no autocorrelation
or heteroskedasticity were in– we concluded in the restricted model below
with a significant r equal to -0.71. This means that 71% of the gap is closed
in one month.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability
RESID (-1) -0.711632 0.234243 -3.038004 0.0038
D(LSPFRB(-1)) 0.105576 0.081557 1.294512 0.2016
D(LSPFRB(-2)) -0.179360 0.074159 -2.418608 0.0193
D(FISCSA) -0.000134 3.83E-05 -3.488068 0.0010
D(LEMBIMEX) -2.185844 0.282332 -7.742113 0.0000
D(LSERVEXPOSA) 0.162499 0.144585 1.123897 0.2665
D(DLPBI93SA) -5.162769 6.275792 -0.822648 0.4147
R-squared 0.709466     F-statistic                     19.94251
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D. Diagnostic Tests of the Estimated Model
1. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (3 lags): given the value
of the Chi square statistic the null hypothesis is accepted in absence of a
second order serial correlation.
F statistic 0.593101 Probability  0.622835
Obs*R
2 2.215419 Probability  0.528918
2. White Heteroskedasticity Test: given the value of the Chi square statistic,
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is accepted.
F statistic  1.158257     Probability  0.340381
Obs*R
2  18.04703     Probability  0.321150
3. Residual Normality (Jarque-Bera): given Jarque-Bera’s value, distributed













Mean   5.41E-16
Median   0.001536
Maximum   0.156558
Minimum  -0.147551
Std. Dev.    0.060317
Skewness    0.007034
Kurtosis    2.776504
Jarque-Bera  0.119102
Probability  0.942188
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.15
4. Cusum Test: we find stable parameters given the sum of recursive
residuals (CUSUM) falls within the confidence interval.156 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
E. Granger Causality Tests
In our study case, we performed the test between SPFRB and real GDP
growth. For the last, we took both the seasonal adjusted rate (DLGDP93SA)
and interannual rate (DLGDP93SAINT). Moreover, we included lags to
evaluate whether the prediction improved (ensuring that conclusions were
robust).
Lags: 4
  Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistic Probability
SPFRB does not Granger Cause DLGDP93SA 55  0.55455  0.69669
DLGDP93SA does not Granger Cause SPFRB  4.92695  0.00217
SPFRB does not Granger Cause 44  0.90667  0.47073
DLGDP93SAINT
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Lags: 7
Null Hypothesis Obs. F-Statistic Probability
SPFRB does not Granger Cause DLGDP93SA 52  1.39898  0.23503
DLGDP93SA does not Granger Cause SPFRB  6.46503  5.3E-05
SPFRB does not Granger Cause
DLGDP93SAINT 41  3.68189  0.00679
DLGDP93SAINT does not Granger Cause SPFRB  4.67331  0.00169
Lags: 8
Null Hypothesis Obs. F-Statistic Probability
SPFRB does not Granger Cause DLGDP93SA 51  1.06819  0.40772
DLGDP93SA does not Granger Cause SPFRB  5.50715  0.00017
SPFRB does not Granger Cause 40  5.00916  0.00110
DLGDP93SAINT
DLGDP93SAINT does not Granger Cause SPFRB  5.53131  0.00058
Lags: 9
Null Hypothesis Obs. F-Statistic Probability
SPFRB does not Granger Cause DLGDP93SA 50  1.01778  0.44769
DLGDP93SA does not Granger Cause SPFRB  4.73020  0.00053
SPFRB does not Granger Cause 39  3.28360  0.01283
DLGDP93SAINT
DLGDP93SAINT does not Granger Cause SPFRB  6.66205  0.00021158 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
We conclude that there is Granger-bicausality when we take the interannual
GDP growth rate (DLPBI93SAINT) and causality from GDP growth to
SPFRB when considering the seasonal adjusted rate (DLGDP93SA).
Therefore, we cannot conclude that there is causality in one or other direction.
This does not necessarily mean there wouldn’t be economic bicausality, as
explained above.
F. Model’s Estimates for 1995-1998
While running this regression we tested parameter stability by reestimating
the model for the period 1995:1 to 1998:12. We did so to be sure that using
100% comparable data regarding debt service series, the original estimation
was robust.
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Probability
LEMBIMEX -2.215928 -29.314590  0.0000
DLSERVEXPOSA  0.496346  3.648050  0.0008
LSERVEXPOSA(-1)  0.290093  2.963182  0.0052
DGDP93SA -22.624350 -8.938552  0.0000
VDFISCSA -0.000161 -5.266922  0.0000
DFISCSA(-1) -0.000187 -7.458693  0.0000
LUST30 -1.818091 -10.591830  0.0000
TEQUILA -0.444245 -6.978366  0.0000
CAVALLO 0.111986  2.940082  0.0056
C 20.04015  42.001500  0.0000
  R
2                        0.979 Adjusted R
2 0.974
  F-statistic 199.1080 Durbin-Watson 1.772159 COUNTR Y RISK
G. Currency Risk  Equation
Dependent Variable: LPRE1_PRE2
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic Probability
LEMBIMEX -3.923817 -5.103475  0.0000
DLSERVEXPOSA  0.923980  0.787861  0.4350
LSERVEXPOSA (-1) -1.300550 -1.698315  0.0965
DLGDP93SA -25.453530 -1.174684  0.2464
VDFISCSA -0.000588 -1.863310  0.0691
DFISCSA (-1) -0.000477 -2.029404  0.0485
LUST30 -5.593929 -3.732279  0.0005
TEQUILA -0.064951 -0.118684  0.9061
CAVALLO 0.549872  1.388512  0.1720
C 35.136530  7.332828  0.0000
  R
2 0.6432 Adjusted R
2 0.57
  F-statistic 8.81 Durbin-Watson 1.30
As observed above, the results are globally quite good though some
variables turn out to be not significant at the individual level. We confirm the
negative effects from those variables connected with contagion effects, fiscal
deficit and debt service to exports ratio, as well as the UST 30 years bond
rate, over PRE1-PRE2. Therefore, we could preliminary ascertain that currency
risk would be associated to a group of the same variables which account for
SPFRB variations.160 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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